|
|
Africa (Part Two / Arabia Africa ) and the Middle East
|
|
|
|
Estimated Number of Printed Pages: 20+
This information duplicates items from the rest of The Factbook, selecting only those items that relate to Africa, specifically Arabian Africa, and the Middle East. However, numbers don't mean much without a comparison to family life in other continents. And that is why we may have included a lot of information on certain issues, but it seems like we have less regional information for others. Actually, that isn't the case – we just chose what were for us notable commonalities or exceptions, cross-culturally. For further information about a particular region, see the regional studies we've referenced in the footnotes: they probably have any additional information you might need on a particular country or region.
Links to Sources for this material are available below. Please also see The Factbook Sources page for further information regarding Factbook sources and their availability.
HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS
62 percent
of Jewish Israeli households are couples with children. 11.
HOUSEHOLD SIZE
74.2 percent
of households in Pakistan have five or more members. 46.
4.9
average family size in urban Egypt in the 1990s. 47.
6.5
average family size in rural Egypt in the 1990s. 48.
Eight
According to a study, the average family size in Qatar. 49.
7.28
average family size in the United Arab Emirates. 50.
EXTENDED FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS
31 percent
of families in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia are extended families, while 69 percent are nuclear families. 13.
MULTIGENERATIONAL HOUSEHOLDS
In North Africa, "The extended family, in the traditional sense of three or more generations living together under the same roof, rarely exists now in the North African region. Most studies point out that the large majority of families are nuclear in structure. This came about as a result of urbanization, industrialization, increased education, migration, and extension of government employment. However, it should be noted, that nuclear families continue to maintain intimate and close ties with other relatives. Though living under separate roofs, interdependence is fostered through intermarriage as well as collaboration in economic activities." 26.
THEORIES AND RESPONSES TO WHY WOMEN DELAY
HAVING CHILDREN AND HAVE FEWER OF THEM
"Very high"
The total fertility rate in Syria between 1960 and 1985, despite the fact that the illiteracy of its childbearing women had been reduced by more than 50 percent. 6.
Lebanon and Jordan, on the other hand –
In both Lebanon and Jordan, women's increasing educational attainment and literacy rates have seemed to have the effect of lowering fertility, and the "average number of births for a non-educated Jordanian mother is much higher than that of a mother who attended high school or received an education beyond high school." 7.
FERTILITY RATE
Over five
The Total Fertility Rate (total fertility rate) of Bhutan, Maldives and Pakistan, 1995-2000. 39.
Six
Total fertility rate in Palestine in 1997, "which is quite high for a country with near zero illiteracy rate." 46.
4.2
Total fertility rate in Kuwait in 2000, a decline from 6.6 in 1980. 47.
Aging – Internationally
1.01 million
Number of elderly in Egypt in 1947. 19.
3.4 million
Number of elderly in Egypt in 1996. That is a 209 percent increase from 1947. 20.
About 5 percent
of population for the "El Mashrek El Araby" countries (e.g. Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Jordan) is elderly. That has been holding fairly steadily for a number of years. 21.
2.6 percent
of Bahrain's total population who were 65 and older, in 1975. 22.
2.9 percent
of Bahrain's total population who were 65 and older, in 2000. 23.
13.2 percent
of Bahrain's total population who were 65 and older, in 2025. 24.
1.6 percent
of Kuwait's total population who were 65 and older, in 1975. 25.
2.0 percent
of Kuwait's total population who were 65 and older, in 2000. 26.
10.3 percent
of Kuwait's total population who estimated to be 65 and older, in 2025. 27.
2.0 percent
of United Arab Emirates' total population who were 65 and older, in 1975. 28.
2.5 percent
of United Arab Emirates' total population who were 65 and older, in 2000. 29.
17.7 percent
of United Arab Emirates' total population estimated to be 65 and older, in 2025. 30.
THE ECONOMICS OF AGING
About 28 percent
of the elderly in Lebanon live below the poverty line. The aged are 6.71 percent of the total population. 46.
CAREGIVING FOR THE AGING
Who Should Be Responsible for the Elderly? Living With The Kids?
Who Should Be Responsible for the Elderly?
92 percent
of the elderly in Kuwait live with their children. 61.
73 percent
of elderly in Cairo, Egypt live with family members while almost 90 percent are being taken care of by their children, whom they live with, or live near by. Elderly without children are more likely to live on their own, or as couples. 62.
MOTHERS' ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Well, there's theory, and then there's reality –
While research in Western nations supports the idea that mothers are the primary socializing agents for their daughters, in rapidly developing Islamic populations, mothers may be acting less so – even though that's their traditional role there, as well. The problem is that some of Islamic world has utterly transformed into a modern society within a decade or two. The ideas the mothers were raised with may be not just irrelevant, but even damaging to young women who are growing up in a modernized world. 11.
In cross-cultural comparisons of Japanese and American mothers, researchers found marked differences in their perceptions in their roles as mothers. American mothers saw their responsibilities as primarily raising the child through adolescence. They saw that they need to provide physical care for the child, but that the father should aid them in this. And they felt no particular duty to raise the child in relationship to its lineage. Japanese mothers saw themselves as having a life-long responsibility for their children. They believed that they were a part of their husband's lineage, and that their role in that was to raise their children to be respectful, cooperative, and highly achievement-oriented. 12.
On the rise –
Despite the region's strong patriarchal traditions, the number of female-headed households is on the increase in all the Arab countries. The new heads of the family included not just divorced women, but widows, those separated from husbands who have had to emigrant to find work, women whose husbands abandoned them or disappeared, women whose husbands have been imprisoned. But it also includes those women whose husbands are unemployed, and those unmarried females who are the sole/main financial supporters of dependent/unemployed families. 16.
But on the other hand,
the patriarchal tradition is so strong, that although an estimated 20 percent of Egyptian women are the financial providers of their family, only 10 percent describe themselves as the head of the family. 17.
In the Arabic world, "women still suffer under present systems particularly in areas of marriage, divorce, custody of children and inheritance. In some parts of the Arab world, women are banned from inheritance, though Islam has granted inheritance rights to females as half of what her brothers inherit. In Tunisia, women inherit an equal share compared to men." 18.
DAUGHTERS' ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
If you really want to keep them down, start early –
In North Africa, girls are taught that they are inferior from a very early age. While more girls are gradually being educated, still many wear are hidden behind veils and closed doors. They are often forced to drop out off school to look after younger siblings. For the large majority, maintaining the family household is still their sole the responsibility. 27.
FACTS ABOUT DADS
Looking forward to when the kid's 18? Try "never" –
In Iran, fathers are expected to support their children until the end of their lives. Financially, he may at some point stop being the provider, but emotionally, he never does.
10 percent
of Jewish Israeli households are single-parent families.
Single Parent Families in Poverty
13 percent
of all British families that were lone-parent families, compared to British-Caribbean households of which were 42 percent were lone-parent, British Indians’s 9 percent , British Pakistanis’ 12 percent , and British Bangladeshis’ 13 percent.
January 2003
Date in Egypt, when the first woman judge was appointed by a presidential decree only in January 2003 – an indication of both the growth of Arabic women's education and preeminence in their fields and how far behind they still are compared to women elsewhere around the globe.
34.7 percent –
of Oman's women were working in the industrial labor force was female by the 1990s.
Seven percent –
of women in the other Gulf nations were working in industry.
45.3 percent –
of Oman's women in the 1990s were working in the service sector – the lowest rate of the Arab Gulf nations.
98 percent –
of the women in Kuwait who worked were working within the service sector.
46.4 percent –
of women age 25 to 44 in Persian Gulf region nations were working in the year 2000.
86 percent
of women in Kuwait and 90 percent of women in Qatar support most families’ reliance upon maids and babysitters as child care providers – even if the mothers are not employed outside the home. This reliance on other the maid/sitters is despite the fact that some researchers argue that these – predominantly emigrant – maids/babysitters do not have the language and cultural skills to raise Arabic children, and the children's resulting poor socialization is a major problem facing the contemporary Persian Gulf family. 23.
CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN CHILD REARING
“Whether there is extensive verbalization with the child may also have something to do with some general cultural conceptions of childhood. Specifically, whether or not caregivers see themselves in an active, child development-oriented, consciously goal-directed ‘childrearing’ role appears to be important. This type of self-role definition is common among educated middle-class (especially Western and particularly American) parents. In contrast . . . Indian caregivers emphasize pleasure between adult and child and experience little pressure to mold the child in a given direction. Similarly, many less-educated, traditional Turkish mothers, talk about the child growing-up (büyür), rather than being brought up (yetistirilir) [the “s” is wrong]. If they mention childrearing, it is more in the sense of enabling the physical growth of the child (büyütmek)(the root verb büyü-mek means literally ‘to get bigger.’”)
In one study, the authors “contrasted the developmental results of differing parental conceptions of cognitive competence (ethnotheories) and their expression in the organization of daily life settings and customs of childrear-ing in Kokwet (Kenya) and in Cambridge (United States). They described life in Kokwet where it is customary for 5-year old children to take care of infants, for 3-year-old boys to drive cows from the garden, and for 8-year-old girls to cook dinner for the family; children from Cambridge would be unable to perform these tasks. However, children from Kokwet do poorly in simple cognitive tests (involving retelling a story), whereas children from Cambridge have no difficulty with this task.”
“Most ethnic minorities in the indus-trialized countries of Europe, North America, and Australia are rather recent immigrants from less developed countries and especially from their rural areas . . . [where] a socially rather than a cognitively oriented conception of competence is valued, stressing conformity – obedience goals, and early learning in the family is based mainly on observation and imitation."
“Indeed, research with ethnic minority families points to this type of parental conception and finds a misfit between this cultural conception of competence and that of the school culture in the host society. For example, Nunes (1993) noted that immigrant Mexican parents in the United States believe, erroneously, that if their children are quiet and obedient and listen to the teacher, then they will succeed in school. Okagaki and Sternberg (1993) similarly found that for immi-grant parents from Cambodian, Mexico, the Philippines, and Vietnam, noncognitive characteristics (i.e., motivation, social skills, and practical school skills) were as important as or more important than cognitive characteristics (problem-solving skills, verbal ability, creative ability) to their conceptions of an ‘intel-ligent first-grade child’– but not for Anglo-American parents. Furthermore, parents’ beliefs about the importance of conformity correlated negatively with children’s school performance, and American-born parents favored developing autonomy over conformity.”
“These two vignettes can be be considered rather extreme; the difference, how-ever, is unmistakably there. In an recent nationwide study in Turkey were inter-views were conducted with than more than 6,000 mothers . . . a child behavior that 73% of the mothers reported as ‘not tolerated’ was ‘the child interrupting adult conversation.’ . . . In non-child centered cultural contexts, where childhood is not considered as special, verbal responsiveness to children may be less. The traditional motto ‘children are to be seen and not heard’ was widespread in the West until recently and it is still there among lower SES groups, but changes over time as well as across cultures have become apparent.
“In the Early Enrichment Project . . . we interviewed mothers of young children, living in low income areas of Istanbul. To find out the degree of others’ involvement/interaction with their 3- to 5-year-old children, we asked them how often they gave their full attention to the child outside of meal times. Those who said, ‘never’ or ‘almost never’ reached 22%. Together with those who said , ‘seldom,’ low involvement was found among 40% of the mothers. In terms of what they commonly do when they are with their children at home, 90% of the mothers stated they do household chores . . . with little direct interaction with their children.”
More than 50 percent
of Israeli children live in a household with one or more siblings.
14.4 percent
of Israeli children are only children.
33 percent
of Israeli children live in a household with three or more siblings.
About 60 percent
of the world's growth of in the number of children under the age of 15 during the 1990s came from just the following five countries: India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Ethopia, Congo (Kinshasa).
26.6 percent
of Israeli children living with a single mother lived in poverty in 1992.
14.0 percent
of Israeli children living with two parents lived in poverty in 1992.
Chart of Top 10 Countries By Under 5
"Pakistan and Indonesia had larger proportions of their population under age 15 than the United States in 2000. However, the United States’ overall larger size offset the younger age distributions of Pakistan and Indonesia so that each country accounted for a roughly similar share of the world’s under-15 population."
About 2 million
Estimated number of working children in Egypt. 63.
In Hammurabi’s Code, “The father was acknowledged as the supreme head of this unit [family]. Codes 192, 193, and 195 are explicit regarding the harsh penalties that would befall any child who did not bestow appropriate honor and respect on the father who reared him. A son could lose a tongue, an eye, or fingers, depending on the circumstances of the offense. The father’s absolute authority extended to a right to use his children as payment of or collateral for debts. He could sell them into slavery or servitude. Still, parental power was not unbridled. Code 117, for instance, . . imposed a three-year limit to this slavery.”
In Ancient Egypt, children – including some girls – were educated: New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art has a letter written by a seventeen-year-old girl around 2000 B.C. which reads: ‘Dear Mother, I am all right. Stop worrying about me.’ Apart from the contemporary tone of the entry, the let-ter exists as evidence that females were being educated in the scribal schools at an early date.”
In later Egyptian history, when they’d been conquered by Rome, “Extended families, uncommon in Rome, were the norm. It was not unusual to have three generations living in a small house.”
During a religious festival of the Ancient Sabeans, the Sabeans pressed grapes and slaughtered a male newborn who was then "boiled and deboned; the flesh was rolled in flour, oil, saffron, raisins, and spices and then over-baked. It was eaten by the priests during the ceremony to Shemal.”
EDUCATION INTERNATIONALLY
" . . . education still has a great value for the family in all Arab countries. Many poor families do their best to send their children to school even if it means giving up other basic needs." 37.
INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF EDUCATION
"Saudi males with university education were hesitant in the early 1980s about marrying a working female even if she was a university graduate. However, the situation is radically changing. A working wife is currently preferred to help the husband in meeting the heavy financial demands of the new urban life. Hence, martial life is now based on true and real partnership as far as supporting household needs. The wife now has a say in the living conditions of her family and shares in decision-making. This transformation was not anticipated a few years ago. However, several socio-cultural groups resist it, although developments show that it is likely to expand and become a more widespread phenomenon." 45.
In the Gulf Countries, "It seems that most young men and women no longer consider marriage as a step that grants them societal membership, although marriage is still an important social matter. Today there are other criteria and other characteristics that confirm a person’s full membership in society, such as educational attainment and occupation or employment." 49.
In the Gulf Countries, "In addition, basic public education offered to males and females is usually accepted in Gulf societies. It constitutes a new and powerful source of socialization that competes strongly with traditional family roles or functions in this regard. The effects of the school and of its requirements are extremely important. The influence of peers, especially during puberty and adolescence, is most serious." 50.
In Kuwait, "Education at the University level is, however, non-segregated, thus providing the possibility for young men and women to become romantically involved, and perhaps get married, following their families' approval. Proceeding with marriage without familial approval is considered socially deviant behavior, and may carry certain sanctions consisting primarily of parental admonishment and temporary (or sometimes permanent) severing of relationships." 51.
95-100 percent
of men and women in North Africa / Arab societies who are 45 years old and older have been married.
"Compared to neighboring Saudi Arabia (Farag et al., 1995), the average age at marriage for Kuwaiti women is 3 years higher (17 and 20.1 years, respectively)."
In Kuwait, "marriage is fairly stable and almost 91 percent of ever-married women in reproductive ages are currently married. In case of widowhood or marriage dissolution, re-marriage does not appear to be very common."
In Kuwait, "Non-marriage is considered a social problem. Popular media and informal discussion with Kuwaiti men and women suggest that societal perceptions of the major appropriate role for a woman continue to be that of a wife and mother. She is expected to combine this role with her role in the labor force if working; her work role is not seen as an alternative to her wife-mother role. Furthermore, it is socially undesirable for an unmarried Kuwaiti woman to live by herself. An overt expression of the concern with the increasing proportion of single women in the population is the formation of a social committee (Al-lajnat-al Othman al-Khairiya, i.e., Al-Othman committee for social welfare) aimed at encouraging the marriage of single women, as second wives of married men, if necessary. A large majority of women and men (96 percent and 86 percent, respectively) were against second marriage according to a poll conducted by a daily newspaper in March 1992 following the establishment of the above committee (Arab Times, March 16, 1992)."
In Kuwait, "The percent of women who remained single by age 29 increased from 5 percent in 1965 to 23 percent in 2000. At the same time, the SMAM (based on Census and registration data) increased by almost 5 years from 18.9 to 23.8. Data from surveys conducted in 1996 and 1999 suggest that the changes were even more rapid. The SMAM was reported to be 25.3 in 1996 Family Health Survey (Alnesef et al, 2000) and 25.5 in our survey in 1999."
In Kuwait, "the SMAM has increased by almost 6.5 years over a period of 35 years from about 19 years to 25.5 years. The mean age at marriage, on the other hand, is now a little over 20 years."
"In the Arab world, the average singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) for women has increased to 26 years in Morocco and 25 years in Jordan, Bahrain and Tunisia (PRB, 1996). The average age at marriage in some Arab countries is thus approaching some of the highest recorded in the world, for example an age of 27.7 years for Japan in 1995 (Retherford et al., 2001). The rise in age at marriage implies an increase in the proportion single (unmarried) at a given point in time and perhaps a reversal in the presumed universality of marriage in Arab Muslim cultures."
In the Gulf Countries, "it seems that most young men and women no longer consider marriage as a step that grants them societal membership, although marriage is still an important social matter. Today there are other criteria and other characteristics that confirm a person’s full membership in society, such as educational attainment and occupation or employment."
"On the whole the proportion of women who never marry has increased significantly in El Mashrek countries since the sixties. When divorced and widowed women are included, the proportion of those who are not currently married increases significantly. It is accepted now more than before that single women can live alone.In Egypt the percentage of women living alone in the age bracket 65 years and older amount to 51.3 percent."
Sociologist Andrew Cherlin wrote, in 1992, “. . . I argue that the 1950s were the more unusual time, that the timing of marriage in the 1970s and 1980s was closer to the typical twentieth-century pattern than was the case in the 1950s. In addtion, the rate of childbearing in the 1960s was unusually high by twentieth-century standards. In some ways the 1970s and 1980s were more consistent with long-term trends in family life than were the 1950s.”
"Some scholars have noted that although civil laws in many Arab societies are deduced from European legislation, family laws regulating marriages, divorces inheritance and custody of children are derived from the Qur’an and Sunna. With respect to marriage, it is considered the duty of every believer to be married."
WHY GET MARRIED?
A union of families –
|
|
|
|
| In North Africa, most marriages are still arranged, and from within the same ethnic community or tribe. That's because marriages there are still still considered to be unions between two families – not just a union between two individuals. 7.
|
|
|
|
|
What do you get the single woman who has everything? A good . . . wife . . . ?
In the Igbo tribe of Nigeria, women who are elderly, or the only heir in the family, may marry a woman, in order to keep the family wealth and name intact. She is socially recognized as the husband. And if her wife becomes pregnant (through known about liasons), the children are the woman's – they continue on the family line. 12.
Almost 50 percent
of Israelis believe that the purpose of marriage is to have children. 15.
11.2 percent
of Israelis believe it is better to be unhappily married, than to be not married at all. 18.
2-5 percent
of marriages in most Arab nations are polygamous – other than Sudan (where it’s higher) and Tunisia (the only Arab nation where it’s illegal, since 1956). 25.
WHO'S THE LUCKY GUY (GIRL)?
$13,000, US.
A sort of wedding present from the Kuwaiti government to the Happy Couple. Half of the money is a gift, to start their married life together on the right financial foot, and the other half is an interest-free loan. The only requirement is that both of them must be Kuwaiti nationals, but that's 90 percent of all marriages in Kuwait. 36.
But for those other 10 percent . . .
sanctions apply. Children born into a marriage between a Kuwaiti wife and a foreign husband, and even raised in Kuwait, are not Kuwaiti citizens. Instead, because Kuwait is a patriarchal society, they inherit the father's nationality. For Kuwaiti men who marries non-Kuwaitis, his children are awarded Kuwaiti nationality at birth. For their wives, achieving nationality a process that can take up to 15 years. 37.
Zero
The number of European nations that prohibit marriage between first cousins. 38.
20-25 percent
of those in Turkey are married to a relative. 43.
35 percent
of Kuwaitis in a study were married to a relative. 19.3 percent were married to their first cousin. Another 10.4 percent had married a second cousin, while 5.5 percent were married to a more distant relative. That's a dramatic decrease in just two decades. In 1983, an estimated 54.3 percent of Kuwaitis were married to relatives. 44.
32.8 percent
of Israeli Arabs are married to a relative. 45.
50.5 percent
of those in the United Arab Emirates are married to a relative. 46.
52 percent
of those in the Saudi Arabia are married to a relative. 47.
54 percent
of those in Oman are married to a relative. 48.
CULTURAL TRADITIONS IN MARRIAGE AND WEDDINGS
Changing roles and rules in the Persian Gulf –
|
|
|
|
| It used to be that dowries were given before marriage – but now things are changing. Dowries are being delayed because of the prospect of divorce – and the fact that women need guarantees before entering into marriage. 55.
At the same time, marriage contracts there now may include conditions set by the bride, including the right to study, work, and have the family live in their own house, apart from the husband's parents. Some even insist on the right to divorce if the husband decided to get a second wife. 56.
|
|
|
|
|
RELIGIOUS AND STATE INVOLVEMENT IN MARRIAGES, HISTORICALLY
"Some scholars have noted that although civil laws in many Arab societies are deduced from European legislation, family laws regulating marriages, divorces inheritance and custody of children are derived from the Qur’an and Sunna. With respect to marriage, it is considered the duty of every believer to be married." 68.
ARRANGED MARRIAGES
In the Middle East, it is also cultural, not exactly religious, that marriages are arranged. Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, and yes, Indian Tamil Catholics and other denominations of Christians, do it, too. 72.
Less than three percent
of Jewish Israelis have never been married by the age of 50.
About 75 percent
of Jewish Israelis remain married for their entire lives.
13 percent
of Israeli marriages in 1999 were a remarriage for at least one – a divorced – spouses – an increase from eight percent in the 1970s.
In the Gulf Countries, "The change in the amount of dowry reflects the effect of rural/urban migration on the one hand and of Islamic movements on the other. The demand of delayed dowry for females in case of divorce expresses new awareness that guarantees for females are required in martial relationships."
In Kuwait, "marriage is fairly stable and almost 91 percent of ever-married women in reproductive ages are currently married. In case of widowhood or marriage dissolution, re-marriage does not appear to be very common. The stock of divorced and widowed women is therefore increasing."
In Kuwait, "About 5 percent of women reported that they were currently in a polygynous union. However, twice as many (10.1 percent) reported that their husband had married more than once during his lifetime, though only 5 percent currently had more than one wife. The level of currently polygynous unions reported by the 1996 Family Health Survey was higher (9.3 percent) than in our survey (Alnesef et al., 2000), probably as a result of methodological and sampling differences, as well as the difference in timing of the surveys. . . . Thus, polygynous marriage has declined remarkably with increase in literacy and educational level."
In Kuwait, "Owing to the gains in life expectancy for both sexes, the percentage of widowed women declined from 15 percent to 6 percent. The percentage of divorced women stayed steady from 1965 to 1985 at 2.6 percent. After that, the percentage almost tripled to 6.9 percent in 2000."
26 percent
of Jewish Israelis had lived with their spouse prior to marry them. Another 19 percent lived with someone else before their spouse, but hadn't ended up marrying them.
63 percent
of Jewish Israelis believe that a couple will benefit by living together prior to marriage. And 60 percent think it's all right to live together, even if the goal isn't marriage.
"Alongside the increase in the age of marriage, the unregistered marriages ”Orfy” among university students and younger people is becoming a phenomenon in Egypt and may be in other Mashrek countries. This type of marriage is usually done without the knowledge of the couple’s families and does not need establishment of a new home or traditional marriage requirements. The unregistered marriage contract does not give the women the same rights recognized by the registered contract and some religious leaders have questioned whether it is in conformity with Islamic teachings. It is difficult to estimate how prevalent these unregistered marriages are in Egypt or elsewhere in El Mashrak El Araby. Those who are practicing this pattern of marriage know, however, the instability of the relationship hence they rarely plan to have children. Accordingly one can argue that such marriages are not really going to affect the fertility rates."
‘Urfi marriage’
a form of informal marriage which is not legally registered, that has been on the rise in Arab nations, during this period. "This form of marriage occurred mainly either as a polygamous marriage, or among young people such as college students in which case both – the man and the woman – have not married before."
60 percent
of Israelis believe that to be childless is to lead an "empty life."
The Key to a Child's Happiness –
a two-parent family, according to 81.3 percent of Iranians.
|
|
|
|
| Generational Responsiblities for an Iranian Family:
|
|
|
|
|
At age 55 and above, this, the eldest generation in a family, is responsible for providing emotional support to the younger generations of the family.
From 30 to 54, this generation is to provide management of the family and household, and to provide economic support for the other generations – younger and older – of the family.
From 15 to 29, this generation is to inculcate the youngest in the cultural heritage of the family, as well as bring innovation to the family.
|
|
|
|
|
Almost 100 percent
of Israeli families have themselves suffered a personal injury or loss, or have a close friend who has had such an experience, during the years of conflict and war.
18,000
Israeli families have had at least one of their own die in military service in 1948.
"In Arabic . . . In young age, the role of the father is to provide for and support the other family members, while the role of the mother is to look after the children and take care of the household activities. As the children mature and parents grow old, it becomes the responsibility of the children to look after and support their parents in old age."
In North Africa, "The hierarchical structure of the family rests on two axes: age and sex. The young are compliant to the old, and women are compliant to men. Traditionally, the source of authority and power that the father exercised stemmed from the fact that he was in possession of the family property and controlled it. This compliance of the young and of females is acquired through socialization. Various agents of socialization are involved in this process starting with the families that emphasize in their children obedience, dependency and inequality between the male and female children. The educational institutions are also involved by emphasizing physical punishment and rote learning, shunning away challenges and independent creative thinking. While children are expected to depend on their parents when they are young, this role is reversed when the parents grow old, it is expected that their children take care of them even at the expense of their own personal interest."
"In the traditional Arab family, the father represents the authority figure (patriarchal tradition), and in return he shoulders the major responsibilities towards his family members. The wife joins the kin group of her husband (patrilocal kinship), while the children take up the father’s family name (patrilineal descent). In that capacity, the father is assigned the role of the bread-winner or provider for his family. This role puts him at the top of the pyramidal structure of his family. Also this role carries with it unquestioning compliance with his instructions as well as respect from all family members. The mother is assigned the role of the housewife, and in that capacity, she is closer to the children and actually exercises power over them, though sometimes she may use the father to threaten them. Some scholars may interpret that as a matriarchal system alongside the patriarchal system in the Arab family. Barakat (1993), however, argues that this matriarchal system supports the existing patriarchy, as it solidifies the pyramidal structure of the family."
In sub-Saharan Africa, "The family as a unit of production, consumption, reproduction, and accumulation, has been profoundly impacted by the economic downturns that transformed the environment in which families make their decisions. These broader socio-political and economic environments provide the contexts for understanding changes in African family structures. Opportunities have arisen from considerable socioeconomic changes that continue to alter the structure of the family away from traditional patterns to new ones generated by the expansion of education, health care, employment, and migration. Yet the same forces that engender significant vistas for families have also produced multiple constraints. African families are embedded in political and socioeconomic circumstances that are characterized by long-standing domestic dynamics of economic fragility, debilitating poverty, poor governance and civil conflicts."
In the Gulf Countries, "Changes in the functions of the Gulf family appear to be certain in light of the generalized public social services provided by the state. Public services have replaced traditional services that carry private character. These developments deprive the family of some of its functions. Moreover, changes in the system of economic production caused the family to give up its productive function."
In the Gulf Countries, "The tribe is still an important authority in determining the behavior of sons and daughters, especially with regard to marital choice. Variable such as tribal descent, ideological and ethnic affiliation remain very influential in the modernizing Gulf society."
In North Africa, "The extended family, in the traditional sense of three or more generations living together under the same roof, rarely exists now in the North African region. Most studies point out that the large majority of families are nuclear in structure (see Tables 1 and 2). This came about as a result of urbanization, industrialization, increased education, migration, and extension of government employment. However, it should be noted, that nuclear families continue to maintain intimate and close ties with other relatives. Though living under separate roofs, interdependence is fostered through intermarriage as well as collaboration in economic activities."
"Differences in family and demographic behaviour are, however, much more striking for migrants coming to Europe and North America from developing countries and in particular from less advanced rural regions in those countries. These immigrants encapsulate in their demographic behaviour more traditional beliefs and customs specific to their agrarian cultural and economic background. Family relations and dynamics are often characterised by patriarchal relations and gender divide, early marriage, low divorce rate, low age at first birth and childbearing into higher ages, high fertility, and larger household size. Because of initial difficulties to adapt to the new social, economic and cultural environment and their ethnic and/or religious differences, they tend to remain isolated from the host culture, living in communities where they strive to preserve traditional family structures, gender relations and cultural specificity in general (Courbage, 2002). The persistence of these behavioural differences is in general interpreted as an example of ineffective integration policies of the receiving country (e.g. Collinson, 1993)."
"In terms of family formation, research on migrants shows that the relational and reproductive behaviour of migrants of European or American origin is not very different from that of the sedentary, non-migrant population in developed countries (e.g. Schoenmaeckers & Callens, 1999). In some cases, immigrants from developed countries show lower nuptiality and fertility rates than the nationals in the host countries."
31 percent
of families in Riyadh are extended families, while 69 percent were nuclear families.
"[T]here exists a trend of transformation toward the nuclear family; however it is a slow trend that does not match the volume of urbanization achieved by the cities in the Gulf region."
In the Gulf Countries, "Rising standards of living of families have enabled them to provide wide alternatives to their children (particularly daughters) that expanded their world and increased their demands, aspirations and expectations far beyond what existed in traditional society."
In the Gulf Countries, "Contemporary means of communication, in all forms, have increased the knowledge of young people and gave them specific alternatives that put them in touch with peers all over the world, and especially in the West. That contact influences the values, traditions and practices of Gulf youth and complicates socialization by their families."
The Arabic equivalent to American concept of family is: ‘aila. The root of that word means: “to support.” 12.
96.9 percent
"in a survey of United Arab Emirates female college students and their mothers, the percentage of the students who were born in a hospital."
90.3 percent
"in a survey of United Arab Emirates female college students and their mothers, the percentage of the mothers who were born at home and / or in a tent."
96.8 percent
"in a survey of United Arab Emirates female college students and their mothers, the percentage of the students’ fathers who were born at home and / or in a tent."
Discovery of oil transformed most Gulf countries until urban societies, so that Kuwait is 90 percent urbanized, Bahrain is at 80 percent, Qatar is at 85 percent, and the United Arab Emirates is at 70 percent.
In three decades, the United Arab Emirates have gone from "a desert life of sheep and camels to a highly developed modern nation."
"To study family life in the [United Arab] Emirates and much of the Gulf is to work in a setting of rapid and dramatic social change. The super highways, luxury autos, density of cell phones, radio, television, and glitzy shopping malls dominate daily life. The abundant life has come for most and it has been welcomed. The abundant life, however, has come very fast; there was no industrial revolution or gradual development of a production economy. With vast oil resources, life was changed in just a few short years. The young women in this study have not known any other life, but their parents and grandparents have often been in a state of cultural shock as they look out the window of today and clearly remember the world in which they were reared."
"Parents and grandparents of the respondents in this study [in the United Arab Emirates] were raised in a world almost totally alien to that of the young female students at Zayed University. Little or no transportation, poor medical care, a lack of formal education, and variations of tribal life characterized previous conditions. In contract, the young women at Zayed University have grow up in a world of great comfort, conveniences, and modern technology. They have access to modern healthcare and hospitals, ample amounts of food, modern automobiles, cell phones, television, domestic help, and direct opportunities in higher education."
"Elsewhere in Africa, the mobility of young males in search of opportunities in urban areas remains a constant feature of migration. Women who migrate are mainly the educated, those seeking to join husbands already in towns, or the heads of the burgeoning number of single-parent families. These trends have undermined the solidity of the traditional family, created family structures, and transferred social responsibilities at the expense of traditional institutions. The impact of migration on divorce and separation is most felt where urban males abandon their wives in rural settings. While the durability of marriages in traditional structures was strengthened by the control maintained by kinship ties, new migration patterns have increased the prospects of divorces, separation, and the opportunity for multiple partners. In most cases, migration encourages males to have wives in the rural areas and other wives or sexual partners in urban settings. Since housing conditions in urban areas prohibit several wives to live together, “matricentric” households have emerged whereby an increasing number of households consist of a wife and children visited frequently by the husband. Although these unions represent a modern adapted version of polygyny, they contribute to family break-ups and the upsurge of female-headed households. Solidarity between spouses is weakened by separation due to migration."
In Africa, "More important, the outcomes of migration movements, notably polygynous unions without regular cohabitation, have put additional pressures on the social and economic responsibilities of women. For the most part, the conditions of women have deteriorated because absent husbands who migrate to cities for a lengthy period often abdicate their economic roles. Thus overall economic changes growing from migration have forced women to play an even greater part in providing for their children’s subsistence either through food production or off-farm income-generating activities. With little means of bringing pressures to bear on their husbands, women have continued to bear most of the costs incurred in the households."
" . . migratory flows are embedded in kinship networks and family relations. Single young men and women who move to the city in search of work usually are part of such kinship networks, having relatives in the city who will act as buffers in their adaptation to city life. When men move by themselves, leaving their wives and children behind, it is likely that they will either return to their communities of origin or eventually bring their families to their new places of residence. Kinship networks are a reinforcing factor. The probability of a more definitive move to the city is linked to the existence of a kinship network there. An in-depth case study of Paraguayan migration to Argentina shows that Paraguayan men who migrate to Argentina with their wives tend to remain for longer periods in the receiving society. They also tend to become permanent residents. Having kin in the area of destination (brothers and sisters, for instance) increased the chances of longer or permanent stays."
8 million
Number of rural people in Iran to have migrated to urban areas within the past 20 years.
"Turkish migrant families in Germany. He found clear indications that kinship relations play an important role in shaping social integration—at least for the first generation of Turkish migrants—while contacts with members of the same ethnic background are not relevant. The integration of migrant families therefore does not develop along ethnic but rather along family lines. Relationships to people from the same country of origin develop quite differently from the patterns of an ethnic community. Moreover, the bilateral social relationships in this context do not tend to be close."
"Nauck underlines the fact that the migration process connected with the chain migration of family members leads to some significant changes within the family and kinship relationships of Turkish migrant families [in Germany].. Instead of settling near the husband’s parents, they tend to move in with the husband’s brothers, while both parents remain in the country of origin. Parents cease to be the closest persons who either provide or receive help in everyday life, since despite their important role as personal advisors on crucial family issues they are simply too far away. The supportive role they fulfilled in the ‘old country’ is taken on by brothers and sisters, as well as by brothers- and sisters-in-law."
"Another striking fact in Nauck´s findings is the great importance of kinship relations for young Turkish migrants [in Germany]. Among Turkish migrants, 50 percent of the daughters and 60 percent of the sons identify at least one brother or sister as an important reference person. These close relationships may be due to the early experience of living together in families with more than one child. A high average spatial distance from one another is an indicator that close relations are not contingent upon living together in one household."
"Algerian wives [living in France] became more important in decisions concerning their children’s education, their matrimonial choices, and their relationship not only with the host society but with the home country as well. Their range of activities was to broaden significantly, and they gained access to a public world previously reserved only for men. Although few Algerian women worked outside the home, they had to contend with different public services, such as schools and health departments, in order to fulfil their role of wife and mother. In such bureaucratic surroundings, they quickly learn that they cannot rely on husbands, who are often equally illiterate and have little leisure time. Andezian’s findings prove the incorrectness of the belief that Algerian women in France are becoming increasingly confined to the domestic world. Immigration has virtually forced them to have contact with the world outside their home. Moreover, Algerian women continue to be excellent, expressive emotional leaders both within their family and their community. Beyond these traditional roles of nurturing, controlling interpersonal relations and spreading information, women have taken on other roles. They are religious leaders, butchers selling lawful meat, shopkeepers selling ritual clothing, tenants of public baths for purification rituals, and singers of ritual chants performed during feasts and such familial events as births, circumcisions and weddings. For the very reason that Algerian men are often too occupied with their salaried work, it is the women using their social networks who assume the task of ensuring the symbolic life of their families. While in Algeria they formerly performed some of these roles—primarily as assistants to men—in France they have become fully responsible for the tasks of making symbolic life both official and legitimate."
"However, Algerian women living in France do not seem to consider their autonomy and competence to be the result of the liberation ideology propagated by Western women. Instead, their role is to do what men can no longer do."
"Morokvasic (1991) also points out that migrant women feel most discriminated against because they are migrants or foreigners. This tends to mask the exploitation by a male employer. It may also force a woman to stand by her husband whatever her relationship with him is. Nevertheless, paid work may enable women to somewhat assert their economic independence vis-à-vis men, though it does create a dependency on work and blocks their reacting to oppressive working conditions. They are less likely to question the unequal distribution of power within their home, or the fact that decision-making in the household may not be an option for them, because their work experience on the outside is often unrewarding and does not represent a sufficiently attractive alternative for social recognition. For this reason, performance in household tasks may remain the only possible source for getting this recognition, thus compelling women to accept the status quo in domestic relations. In a hostile environment, they may also feel like they are in the same boat with their husband and will therefore offer solidarity and seek compromise rather than seeking change through conflict."
"Population research on migrants who are ethnically more diverse, particularly those from developing countries, shows that, notwithstanding the initial differences in family behaviour, demographic integration gradually does occur with the increased duration of stay. Changes are also observed between successive generations. Marriage rates, age at marriage, adolescent births, fertility rates (Figure 12), and extra-marital births all show a tendency to converge to the levels of the receiving country."
"International migration increases chances of the formation of mixed couples. There are, however, strong differences according to ethnic origin, religion, gender, and developmental stage of the country of origin. Whereas immigrants coming from developing countries initially remain largely endogamous, migrants from developed countries are more exogamous."
"In terms of family formation, research on migrants shows that the relational and reproductive behaviour of migrants of European or American origin is not very different from that of the sedentary, non-migrant population in developed countries (e.g. Schoenmaeckers & Callens, 1999). In some cases, immigrants from developed countries show lower nuptiality and fertility rates than the nationals in the host countries."
"Differences in family and demographic behaviour are, however, much more striking for migrants coming to Europe and North America from developing countries and in particular from less advanced rural regions in those countries. These immigrants encapsulate in their demographic behaviour more traditional beliefs and customs specific to their agrarian cultural and economic background. Family relations and dynamics are often characterised by patriarchal relations and gender divide, early marriage, low divorce rate, low age at first birth and childbearing into higher ages, high fertility, and larger household size. Because of initial difficulties to adapt to the new social, economic and cultural environment and their ethnic and/or religious differences, they tend to remain isolated from the host culture, living in communities where they strive to preserve traditional family structures, gender relations and cultural specificity in general (Courbage, 2002). The persistence of these behavioural differences is in general interpreted as an example of ineffective integration policies of the receiving country (e.g. Collinson, 1993)."
"Arab African countries and Latin America were the receiving countries after the First World War. Migration then shifted afterwards to the Gulf countries particularly to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait."
Ten-Fold
The increase in migration from Egypt to the oil / Gulf countries in need of outside labor to from 1975 to 1984. "Jordanian migrants increased four times during the same period."
" . . for men in Western Mexico migration has become a central strategy for achieving family objectives."
"Political exile is usually an experience of people involved in political action in the public sphere (typically in middle class metropolitan educated populations, but also trade union and peasant leaders among the working classes), while displacement occurs more often among the rural and often remote population. It involves everybody - women and children, the elderly and the infirm."
$2 billion
"As early as 1979, remittances by Egyptian workers abroad, which was equivalent to the combined earnings from cotton exports, Suez Canal transit fees and tourism."
12.1 percent
of Egypt’s GNP in 1984/1985, that was remittances from abroad.
31.7 percent
of Jordan’s GNP in 1984/1985, that was remittances from abroad.
52 percent
of Lebanon’s GNP in 1988, that was remittances from abroad.
"Every country in North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Sudan and Tunisia) had a negative net migration during the 1990s."
"Studies of the impact of the migration of heads of households on [Arab] families left behind show that such moves are taken in order to generate more income to improve the overall standard of living of family members. On the other hand, these moves entail a measure of sacrifice: on the wives who have to take over the responsibility of running the day-to-day affairs of the household – a task usually carried out by the males; and on the husbands who soon realize that as expatriates in the countries of destination, they have to endure loneliness and hard work as well as living a meager life to have enough savings to send to their families. Studies also show that when these arrangements are prolonged over long periods of time, the new arrangements and division of labor among family members left behind start to solidify and become resistant to change, should the husband/father come back (Stack, 2001)."
"In a comparative study of the impact of migration on the demographic behavior of the populations in Egypt and Morocco, Courbage (1994) asserts that the emigrant is an influential agent of social as well as familial change. The emigrant, who is usually the male head of the household has a major effect on the consumption patterns of members of his household by what he sends or brings with him when he comes for visits. Directly or indirectly, he inspires aspirations towards upward mobility. Often this involves a reevaluation of the costs/benefits of an additional child."
". . . it is worth mentioning that the destination of migrants plays an important role in shaping the values they acquire along with the material goods. Most Egyptians migrate to oil-rich countries in the Gulf, where pro-natalist values predominate, as these countries have vast resources and relatively small populations. On the other hand, Moroccan migrants as well as Tunisians usually seek work opportunities in Europe, where small families have become the norm. Consequently, the decline in Moroccan fertility was larger than that of Egyptian fertility. Furthermore in Morocco, quite often the emigrant’s family leaves the village and moves to the city so as to make better use of the money sent from abroad. In this move, they adopt urban reproductive norms. Also compulsory education is more readily observed in the cities. With increasing educational attainment for girls, continued reduction in fertility behavior is expected."
"Some [Arab] research findings show that absence of the father seems to have an impact on the social, psychological, moral and cognitive development of his children. In the typical patriarchal families, children develop a certain concept of the father as someone who exercises authority and provides protection and security. In cases of children with absent or separated fathers, studies show that father concept becomes distorted, particularly if this absence/separation occurs when the children are quite young. The early father child relationship has been found to be important for the child’s self-esteem and self-confidence. Paternal deprivation seems to result in the development of certain apprehensions in children, as well as impaired development of successful peer relationships (Abdalla, 2001)."
About 500,000
in 1995, number of Egyptians, "mostly single, unskilled men were working on construction sites in Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Another 50 000 were employed elsewhere in the Middle East." Before 1974, the Egyptian emigrant population was a small number, primarily of professionals.
"Syria does not put any restrictions on outside migration inspire of the fact that most migrants are above the average education level of the Syrian population."
"Iraq was a labour importing country until its second war, and used to give free entrance without a visa to all Arabs."
|
|
|
|
| "In 1990-1991, changing political and economic developments in the Arab oil rich countries resulted in El Mashrek workers returning to their home countries:
|
|
|
|
| Up to one million Egyptian workers ret | | |
